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Introduction
The Consumer Federation of America has long opposed the federal sugar program as costly to
consumers. The program relies on a system of price supports and import restrictions to keep prices paid
to U.S. producers above the world market.
1 Unfortunately, much of this increased income to growers is
passed on to consumers as an added cost by those who buy sugar from producers—that is, food
processors and retailers. 
Consumers pay this hidden subsidy when they buy food products containing sugar at the grocery store. It
amounts to a hidden food tax that hits poor Americans the hardest, since they spend a larger percentage
of their income on food than other families.
2 
In a report issued in June 2000, the General Accounting Office took an exhaustive look at the sugar
program. It concluded that the cost of the program to sugarcane refiners, food manufacturers and
consumers was about $1.5 billion in 1996 and about $1.9 billion in 1998.
3 The 2000 report followed a
1993 GAO report that put the cost of the sugar program to sugar users at $1.4 billion.
4 
Had there been no sugar program, GAO estimated that, for table sugar alone, consumers would have
saved nearly $600 million in 1996 and nearly $800 million in 1998, assuming all savings from ending
the program were passed on by processors and retailers. That equates to a savings of eight to 10 cents per
pound, or 40 to 50 cents on a five-pound bag of sugar.
5 
Supporters of the sugar program dispute these findings. They suggest, when it comes to sugar, there is
little or no correlation between wholesale and retail prices and that only food processors and retailers
benefit from reduced wholesale sugar prices. According to the growers, food companies will simply6 See page 9 of the testimony of Jack Roney, director of economics and policy analysis, American Sugar Alliance, before the
House Agriculture Committee, July 18, 2001.  
7 See, for example: A Study of the Relationship Between Farm Level Prices and Retail Food Prices, Dale Heien, U.S. Council
on Wage and Price Stability, September 1976; “The Effects of Changing Input Costs on Food Prices,” R. McFall Lamm and
Paul C. Westcott, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, May 1981; or “Why Do Food Prices Increases?” Michael
Belongia, Journal of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, April 1983.  
8 GAO/RCED-00-126, p. 24. 
9GAO/RCED-00-126, p. 97. 
pocket any savings from reforming the sugar program by reducing the support price.
6 Put another way,
they say there is no a so-called consumer “pass-through” of ups and downs in raw commodity prices. 
But both common sense and long-standing economic thought
7 suggest that, over time, significant
increases or decreases in ingredient or other major input costs are reflected in retail prices. The theory is
simple. In a competitive market, any company that fails to reflect reduced input costs in its prices
eventually will lose sales to manufacturers of similar products. The GAO cited this argument in
discussing table sugar prices, noting that this market is highly price-competitive. “With a homogeneous
product such as sugar,” GAO said, “each brand is almost perfectly substitutable for another. When
substitutability between products is nearly perfect, it is more difficult for sellers to insulate their products
from the price competition of rivals.”
8
At another point, the GAO specifically rejected the growers argument that there would be no pass-
through of savings to consumers from sugar program reform. While declining to specify a pass-through
amount, GAO said: “In the absence of the sugar program we believe that it is unlikely that no cost
reductions would be passed through to final consumers, particularly in the case of table sugar.”
9 
What Have Sugar Prices Done Over Time?
Figures 1 and 2 (attached at the end of this statement) track wholesale and retail sugar prices from 1977
through 2001. A review of those graphs and the data behind them leads to several conclusions: 
! In general, retail sugar prices have followed wholesale prices up and down since the late 1970s. The
movements are rarely perfectly symmetrical, however, and wholesale price increases are more likely
to be passed on than price decreases. 
! There is a clear decoupling of the wholesale and retail prices from 1995 to 1999. Clearly, something
happened to disturb the pattern in this period.
! There is a gradual widening of the farm-to-retail price spread—the difference between the wholesale
and retail prices—over time. Until the mid-1990s, however, the increase in spread, if the cane and
beet wholesale prices are averaged, was generally in line with inflation. 
Table 1 compares changes in wholesale and retail sugar prices in five-year intervals from 1980 through
2001. From 1980 to 1984, a 28 percent drop in the raw cane sugar price and a 33 percent drop in the
refined beet sugar price corresponds to a 15 percent decline in the retail sugar price. That’s about a 50
percent pass-through of savings to consumers from lower wholesale prices. 10 In the summer and fall of 2001, both the House and Senate rejected by wide margins farm bill amendments to reform the
sugar program. Instead of reforming the program, the House voted to reimpose federal limits on how much sugar can be
grown and sold in this country. In the Senate, Idaho Republican Larry Craig was just one of those who cited the disparity
between wholesale and retail prices as justification to oppose reform. “Over the last couple of years,” he said, “we have seen
a dramatic decline in sugar prices in this country, even with the current program. Nowhere have we seen any one retail
product on the consumer market shelf decline as a result of the reduction in sugar...I don’t think the (reform amendment)
brings down the price one penny on a candy bar, one penny on a bottle of pop, or any other commodity in the marketplace,
from boxed cereal to any other product that has sugar added to it...That is simply a false argument.” 
11 See Figures 12 and 13 from the Roney testimony, House Agriculture Committee, July 18, 2001.  
From 1985 to 1989, when wholesale prices rose 12 percent for raw cane sugar and 25 percent for refined
beet sugar, retail prices increased 13 percent. That’s considerably less than a 100 percent pass-through of
increased costs to consumers. From 1990 to 1994, a five percent decline in the cane sugar price and a 16
percent decline in the beet sugar price prompted a 6.5 percent decline in the retail price. That’s about a
60 percent pass-through of savings if you average the cane and beet decreases. 
This rough correlation of price increases and decreases disappears in the last half of the 1990s, a point
sugar growers have used effectively in Congress to ward off challenges to the sugar program in 2000 and
2001.
10 From 1995 to 1999, the price for raw cane sugar declined 5.4 percent while the price for
wholesale refined beet sugar increased 3.4 percent. Over the same period, the price for retail refined
sugar increased 8.6 percent. Although based on only 18 months’ worth of data, in 2000-2001 the price
correlation appears to return. In fact, the increase in the retail sugar price lags well behind both the
increase in the cane sugar price and refined beet sugar price for this period. 
Table 1
Changes in U.S. Wholesale and Retail Sugar Prices, 1980 - 1999




Change in Retail Refined
Sugar Price
1980 -1984 - 27.8 percent - 33.0 percent  - 14.9 percent
1985 - 1989 + 12.1 percent + 25.3 percent + 13.3 percent
1990 - 1994 - 5.2 percent - 16.1 percent - 6.5 percent
1995 - 1999 - 5.4 percent + 3.4 percent + 8.6 percent
 2000 - 2001 + 10.4 percent* +7.5 percent* + 2.5 percent**
Source: Consumer Federation of America calculations, based on Economic Research Services tables in Sugar and Sweetener Situation and
Outlook Report, SS-232, September 2001, and available by FAX. Shown are changes in average annual prices between1980 and 1984,
1985 and 1989, 1990 and 1994, 1995 and 1999, and 2000 and 2001. 
* 2001 data is though September only.
** 2001 data is through August only. 
Still, it is inescapable that, in the last half of the 1990s, as the wholesale price of sugar plummeted,
processors and retailers did not pass on savings to consumers. The sugar growers, understandably, point
to this as proof that there is no consumer pass-through of wholesale sugar price changes.
11 
Let me suggest an alternative view, based on a longer look at the price fluctuations. While retail refined
sugar prices generally have followed wholesale prices up and down, in the mid- to late-1990s, something
happened to disturb the market and upset the usual pattern. 12 Among large food processing mergers in recent years: Kraft Foods purchased Nabisco, General Mills acquired Pillsbury,
and Dean Foods combined with Suiza Foods. All of these companies are major purchasers of sugar. Dean Foods and Suiza
Foods were the nation’s No. 1 and No. 2 dairy processors. Together, they control about 30 of the national market. Many view
a market as noncompetitive if four firms have more than 40 percent of sales. Among retailers, between 1992 and 1998, the
share of sales of the four largest firms increased from 16 percent to nearly 30 percent. 
13 The growers are among those who make this argument. In his July 2001 House Agriculture Committee testimony, the
ASA’s Roney said: “Lack of competition among food retailers apparently is the main reason these companies can succeed in
not passing along to consumers the lower prices they pay for sugar and other agricultural products.” 
14 Such a pattern emerged in New England under the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact from 1996 to September 2001.
Retail prices increased beyond the amount dictated by the increase in the farm price of milk under the compact. Specifically,
retail prices plateaued—or failed to recover fully—after two price spikes prompted by increases in the base federal price for
milk. See Report on the Operation and performance of the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact, July 200, and Impact of the
Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact on Consumer Prices for Fluid Milk, June 2001, both by Kenneth W. Bailey, Department of
Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, Penn State University. 
15 Over the last five years, beet sugar has accounted for about 53 percent of total U.S. sugar production while cane sugar
accounted for 47 percent. CFA calculations based on data in Sugar and Sweetener Situation & Outlook, SSS-232, USDA
Economic Research Service, September 2001, p. 32.   
Since this period was also marked by a wave of mergers and acquisitions in the food industry,
12 one
possible explanation for the failure of retail sugar prices to drop is agribusiness consolidation and a
resulting decrease in competition.
13 A prerequisite of the consumer pass-through argument is sufficient
competition among processors and retailers to trigger price declines when input costs fall. In a
competitive market, individual processors will seek to get an edge on their competitor by passing on a
reduction in input costs to consumers. In a noncompetitive market, processors may be able to do the
reverse.
14 That is, they may be able to increase their profits by keeping prices high and, to use the phrase
I used earlier, pocket any savings from reduced wholesale prices. If recent consolidation in food
processing and retailing has created anti-competitive conditions, that’s a likely explanation why the
previous correlation between wholesale and retail sugar prices disappeared in the late 1990s. 
What about the farm-to-retail price spread—the widening gap between the wholesale and retail prices of
sugar? Some argue that, while the wholesale price of sugar has not kept up with inflation, everything
else needed to prepare sugar for the retail market has. As a result, if the price spread widen, it is because
of inflation’s effect on these other items. 
An analysis of price changes since 1977 indicates that the cane price spread generally lagged behind
inflation while the beet price spread outpaced it until the mid-1990s, when both exceeded inflation (see
Table 2).  If the cane and beet spreads are added together and averaged,
15 the combined spread lags
behind or only slightly exceeds inflation until 1995-2001, when it outstrips inflation by 3.5 cents, or
about 20 percent (See Table 3).  Table 2
Cane and Beet Farm-to-Retail Price Spreads Versus Inflation, 
In Cents per Pound, 1977 - 2001 








Cane  22.4 10.6 31.0 & 8.6 14.6 24.9 & 2.5
Beet  20.7 6.5 19.0 % 1.7 10.7 18.2 % 2.5








Cane  22.4 19.5 26.4 & 4.0 16.9 19.6 % 2.8
Beet  20.7 12.9 17.8 % 2.9 14.2 16.5 % 4.2
Source: Consumer Federation of America calculations, based on Economic Research Services tables in Sugar and Sweetener Situation and
Outlook Report, SS-232, September 2001, and available by FAX. Shown are changes in average annual cane and beet margins in selected
years, compared with what inflation alone would do to those margins, and the difference between the two. 
* 2001 data is though August only.
Table 3
Average of Cane and Beet Farm-to-Retail Price Spreads Versus Inflation, 
In Cents Per Pound, 1977 - 2001










21.5 8.5 24.8 & 3.3 12.6 20.7 % .8










21.5 16.2 21.9 & .4 15.5 18.0 % 3.5
Source: Consumer Federation of America calculations, based on Economic Research Services tables in Sugar and Sweetener Situation and
Outlook Report, SS-232, September 2001, and available by FAX. Shown are changes in the average of the annual cane and beet margins in
selected years, compared with what inflation alone would do to those margins, and the difference between the two. 
* 2001 data is though August only.
So, again, there is a noticeable problem—in this case a widening of the farm-to-retail price spread
beyond inflation—in the mid- to late-1990s. While the growers see this as a reason to oppose sugar
program reform, CFA sees at least two separate issues. 
First, we firmly believe that, in a competitive market, major ups and downs in wholesale prices will be
reflected in retail prices paid by consumers. Is the pass-through perfectly symmetrical? No. Does the
consumer benefit lag behind the wholesale price movements? Probably. Will the pass-through be 100
percent when wholesale prices drop? Probably not. But we remain convinced, based on our review of the
numbers, that consumers will in fact benefit from reform of the sugar program. 16 The decoupling of the prices in the late 1990s can be viewed as compounding the injury to consumers from the sugar
program. The consumer pays more thanks to the high domestic price of sugar and sees no savings—in fact, the consumer
pays even more—when the wholesale price goes down. 
17 See Roney testimony, Figures 12 and 13. 
18 GAO put it this way: “In sugar refining, the cost of raw sugar is a much larger share of the total cost of production compared
with its share in the production of other food products. Therefore, a change in the cost of raw sugar would be likely to have a
larger effect on the price of table sugar than on the prices of sugar-containing products.” GAO/RCED-00-126, pp. 23-24.
USDA’s Economic Research Service adds that, the larger the share an input has in  the total costs of a food product, the
more likely a change in that input’s cost will affect the food product’s price. See ERS website: Food CPI, Price and
Expenditures: How Changes in Input Costs Affect Food Prices.
19 Food price data in this paragraph is taken from Bureau of Labor Statistics tables showing monthly and yearly changes in
average U.S. prices for all food items, the “sugar and sweets” CPI index, and the candy and chewing gum subcategory.
Candy and gun account for 60 percent of the total sugar and sweets index. The tables are found on the BLS website. 
20 The inflation rate for sugar and artificial sweeteners for this period was 2.3 percent. Sugar accounts for all but two percent
of this ERS category. The inflation rate for the “other sweets” category was close to the all-food rate at nine percent. Once
again it appears that moving from refined sugar to more highly processed foods brings the inflation rate closer to the all-food
rate. Data from BLS plus Sugar and Sweetener Situation & Outlook, SSS-232, USDA Economic Research Service,
September 2001, page 28. 
At the same time, it is very clear that consumers did not benefit from the free fall in wholesale prices in
recent years. In fact, the opposite happened. The wholesale price dropped and the retail price held steady
or increased. Some might call that price gouging. We strongly suspect this is industry increasing profits
at consumers’ expense—that is, processors or retailers exercising increased market power, probably as a
result of increased concentration during the period.
16 Put another way, the market is becoming anti-
competitive. 
But if the problem is market power, the solution isn’t retaining the sugar program. It’s fostering a more
competitive market. CFA has attempted to do this by supporting key provisions of the competition title
in the new farm bill and by opposing several recent mergers in the food and agricultural area. 
What about products like candy, chewing gum and cake mixes? These items contain substantial amounts
of sugar, but they are more highly processed than table sugar. Sugar growers cite recent increases in the
price of these items as further proof there is no consumer pass-through when it comes to sugar.
17 But for
these products, because they are more highly processed, the price manufacturers pay for sugar is not
likely to be the primary determinant of the retail price.
18 As a result, it is not realistic to expect these
prices to decline when the wholesale price of sugar declines. What might be expected in response to a
significant decline in wholesale sugar prices is a moderating of price increases. 
And in this case, government price data indicate that is largely what has happened (See Table 4). Food
prices in general increased 10.1 percent between 1998 and 2001, somewhat more than the overall
inflation rate for the period.
19 But for all sugar and sweets—a government category that includes refined
sugar and artificial sweeteners, candy and gum, and other high-sugar items like jellies, jams, honey, and
marsh mellows—prices increased only 5.5 percent.
20 For candy and gum alone, prices increased 5.7
percent. So prices for all these items together increased at a rate a little more than half that of the food
price inflation rate. In our view, at least some of that difference is a consumer benefit from the recent
free fall in wholesale sugar prices. Table 4
Changes in Food, Sugar & Sweets, and Candy & Gum Prices, 1998 - 2001
Year CPI All Food Sugar & Sweets Candy & Gum
1998 + 1.6 percent + 2.1 percent + 1.5 percent +1.3 percent
1999 + 2.7 percent + 2.0 percent +1.5 percent + 2.1 percent
2000 + 3.3 percent + 2.8 percent + .6 percent + 1.1 percent
2001 + 1.5 percent + 2.8 percent + 1.7 percent + 1.1 percent
1998 - 01 + 9.5 percent + 10.1 percent + 5.5 percent + 5.7 percent
Source: Consumer Federation of America calculations, based on data available on the Bureau of Labor Statistics website. Shown are
changes in the U.S. city average CPI for each category from December of the previous year to December of the year listed. The 1998 to
2001 changes are from December 1997 to December 2001.
Government price data for two additional product categories containing large amounts of sugar suggest
they do not lag as far behind the food inflation rate as sugar and sweets in general or candy and gum in
particular (See Table 5). Compared with 10 percent inflation for all food items since 1998, cereal has
increased seven percent and cookies and cakes have increased about nine percent. Yet another high-
sugar item, ice cream, has almost doubled the food inflation rate, increasing 19.8 percent since 1998. But
that probably has more to do with changes in federally controlled price of milk than sugar prices. 
Table 5
Changes in Cereal, Cookies & Cakes and Ice Cream Prices, 1998 - 2001
Year All Food Cereal Cookies & Cakes  Ice Cream 
1998 + 2.1 percent + 1.9 percent + 2.1 percent + 7.2 percent
1999 + 2.0 percent + 2.1 percent +2.8 percent + 0.8 percent
2000 + 2.8 percent + 1.2 percent + 1.7 percent + 1.8 percent
  2001 + 2.8 percent + 1.6 percent + 1.6 percent + 8.8 percent
1998 - 01 + 10.1 percent + 7.0 percent + 9.1 percent + 19.8 percent
Source: Consumer Federation of America calculations, based on Bureau of Labor Statistics data and 
Economic Research Service data in Sugar and Sweetener Situation and Outlook Report, September 2001. Shown are changes in the U.S.
city average CPI for each category from December of the previous year to December of the year listed. The 1998 to 2001 changes are from
December 1997 to December 2001.
So, while the growers argue there is no pass though to consumers and no likely benefit to consumers
from lower wholesale sugar prices, CFA feels there is some evidence consumers have benefitted from
sharply lower wholesale sugar prices in recent years.21 GAO/RCED-93-84, p. 30. 
22 Roney testimony, p 16. 
23 USDA Announces Steps to Reduce Sugar Inventory, News Release No. 0167.01, U.S. Department of Agriculture, August
31, 2001.
24 SSS-232, p. 3.   
25 Statement of Senator Richard Lugar (R.-Ind.) during floor debate on the farm bill, December 12, 2001, Congressional
Record, p. S13015.   
26 Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate, S. 1731, Agriculture, Conservation and Rural Enhancement Act of 2001,
December 5, 2001, pp. 5-6.
27 “Restoring the Everglades: Challenge for Agriculture,” Agricultural Outlook, USDA Economic Research Service, September
1997. 
28 Sugar and Sweetener Situation & Outlook, SSS-232, USDA Economic Research Service, September 2001, p. 4.   
Other Problems with the Sugar Program 
There are problems with the sugar program beyond increased grocery bills. Let me touch on just three. 
! The cost of the sugar program would be more palatable if most of what consumers paid helped
struggling family farmers stay on their land. Unfortunately, since benefits under the sugar program
accrue on a per-pound basis, the bulk of the benefits go to those who least need it—that is, the
largest, most financially secure growers. According to the General Accounting Office’s 1993 report,
more than 40 percent of the benefits from the sugar program went to the top one percent of the
growers in 1991.
21 Benefits were particularly concentrated among cane sugar growers, 33 of whom
reaped in excess of a million dollars a year each. These are not struggling family farmers.
! Plummeting wholesale sugar prices in recent years have added a taxpayer cost to the program as
well. CFA isn’t necessarily opposed to taxpayer-supported government programs. But we’d like to
see them accomplish something useful. And in the case of sugar, that’s questionable. In 2000, high
domestic production triggered the forfeiture of about 1 million tons of sugar at a taxpayer cost of
nearly half a billion dollars.
22 That surplus is now being reduced under a program that gives surplus
sugar back to growers who agree to not produce more price-depressing sugar.
23 But taxpayers are still
paying more than $1 million a month simply to store government-owned sugar.
24 USDA projects
that, by the end of this decade, the government will own 4 million tons of sugar acquired through
forfeitures.
25 In addition, changes in the sugar program included in the Senate farm bill would add
another half a billion dollars in costs over the next 10 years, according to the Congressional Budget
Office.
26 
! Sugar production harms the Florida Everglades and the sugar program encourages more sugar
production in south Florida. Since the 1950s, some 700,000 acres of marsh—roughly a fourth of the
Everglades—has been developed for growing sugar cane and other farm crops.
27 Today, Florida
accounts for roughly half of the nation’s sugar cane production.
28 This disrupts water flows and adds29 According to The Everglades Trust, for 20 years, 200 tons of phosphorus have been dumped from sugarcane fields into the
Everglades. As a result, it says, the Everglades shrinks by three to five acres a day. From the testimony of Mary Barley, The
Everglades Trust, before the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, January 7, 2000. 
30 Whenever reform of the sugar program is discussed, questions are raised about impacts on producers, especially sugar
beet producers. An indication of what reform of the program would mean can be found in Assessing Economic Impacts of
Liberalizing WTO Sugar Tariff Rate and Minimum Access Commitments by the United States, by Stephen Haley, USDA
Economic Research Service, Sugar and Sweetener Situation & Outlook, SSS-231, May 2001. Haley looked  at the effect of a
50 percent increase in sugar imports combined with a four-cent reduction in the sugar loan rate. After 10 years, Haley found
total sugar production down 16 percent, with beet production down 12 percent and cane production down 19 percent.
Presumably, a cash assistance package targeted on the smallest producers would lessen the impact of these reductions,
especially among beet producers. 
31 “A Safety Net for Farm Households?” USDA Agricultural Outlook, January-February 2000. 
pollutants such as phosphorous to the Everglades ecosystem.
29 Congress has begun a multi-billion-
dollar, 20-year Everglades cleanup and the growers are helping in that effort. But as long as the sugar
program encourages more sugar production in Florida, these efforts will be less effective than the
could be. 
Working Toward a Solution
In lieu of the sugar program, Congress should consider a targeted assistance package for those small
sugar producers needing help to survive.
30 This would be more effective than the current program. It
would concentrate assistance where it’s needed the most, not on the largest, wealthiest producers. And it
would be paid for progressively, with those least able to pay contributing less proportionately, not more. 
CFA is very concerned about the continuing decline in our family farms. These small farms add much to
the economic and social fabric of the nation and we should do what we can to preserve them. And,
clearly, some small sugar beet farmers in the Upper Midwest and elsewhere face serious financial
problems. They deserve help. We simply feel price support programs like the sugar program are an
inefficient way to assist them, because they are paid for regressively and concentrate benefits on the
wealthiest producers.
Repeatedly in the last few years, as economic conditions in rural America deteriorated, CFA raised the
possibility of a means-tested program to save the remaining family farms. A 2000 Economic Research
Service analysis looked at different approaches to a “farm household safety net” based on income or
expenditure thresholds used in other federal assistance programs. The analysis found that these safety
nets would cost about as much as current farm programs. But who received the benefits changed
dramatically. Under the safety nets, a much larger percentage of benefits went to smaller farms or those
with limited resources.
31 Serious consideration should be given to a program along these lines to assist
all small farms, including those producing sugar. 
Such a sweeping change won’t happen over night. And it certainly would entail government cost. But at
least taxpayers would know they were providing subsidies to farmers who need help, not wealthy Florida
cane growers. And there is some reason to hope that Congress may move in this direction. 
Late last year the Senate Agriculture Committee abandoned a plan for a new milk price floor—another
regressive price support program—in favor of a $2 billion, four-year, taxpayer-paid dairy subsidy,32 Senate floor statement. Senator Tom Harkin (D.-Iowa), chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee, December 11,
2001, Congressional Record, p. S. 12839. 
Retail* vs. Wholesale** Sugar Prices
capped so the largest farms don’t receive more than mid-sized farms.
32 The Committee’s program is far
from perfect. The a cap on benefits—8 million pounds of milk annually—is too high. And, of course, the
underlying dairy price support program would continue. It is also far from certain the new program will
survive the farm bill conference. Nonetheless, for the moment, the new dairy program is a step away
from consumer-paid subsidies and toward the taxpayer-paid benefit program we prefer. 
Conclusion
The sugar program has been picking the pockets of American consumers for decades. 
A review of the price data convinces CFA at least that consumers will benefit from sugar program
reform, assuming a competitive market. While the pass-through is not typically 100 percent, for most of
the last 20 years retail sugar prices have gone up and down with wholesale price changes. Likewise,
while the farm-to-retail price spread has increased, until the mid-1990s it did not outstrip inflation.
Finally, there is evidence that consumers have benefitted from the recent free-fall in wholesale sugar
prices, in the form of very moderate retail price increases in items like candy and gum. 
At the same time, it is clear that consumers did not benefit as much as they should have from declines in
wholesale sugar prices since the mid-1990s. But that is likely a concentration issue and should be dealt
with as a concentration issue. It is separate from sugar program reform. 
Because benefits are awarded on a per-pound basis, the sugar program also helps mostly the wrong
producers. It gives too much to those who don’t need the help and too little to those who do. And it asks
consumers...especially low-income consumers...to pick up the tab. In recent years the sugar program has
added taxpayer costs as well as consumer costs, all the time continuing to damage the Everglades. This
program is ripe for reform. Figures 1 & 2  